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Getlink SE · GET · Euronext Paris

Getlink operates the only fixed link between the United Kingdom and continental Europe — the Channel Tunnel — under a dual-state treaty running to 2086, earning 78% of group EBITDA from inflation-indexed rail tolls and dynamically priced truck/passenger shuttles, with a 1 GW power cable and a small French rail-freight arm bolted onto the same asset.

$21.78
Share price
$11.8B
Market cap
$1.9B
Revenue (FY2025)
2086
Concession runs to
Figures converted from EUR at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Listed 2007 post-restructuring of Eurotunnel; ten-year tape spans an $11–$23 band — $11 in April 2016, peaked $19 in August 2022 on the ElecLink energy spike, $22 today after a Q1 2026 breakout that stalled.
2 · The tension

The $1,009M EBITDA beat included a $65M insurance reclassification — strip it and the underlying went backwards.

  • What the press release said. FY2025 EBITDA $1,009M cleared the $917–975M guide and arrived alongside a fresh $1.18B/2030 target. The market read momentum and held the $22 median price target unchanged.
  • What the audit note shows. $65M of ElecLink insurance compensation was booked inside EBITDA in 'other income' — only $6M was actually collected in cash; $59M sits as a receivable. Ex-insurance, the company's own restated FY2025 EBITDA was $966M, against an FY2024 reported base of $865M, or minus 1% like-for-like in native units (EUR strengthened sharply between period-ends).
  • What the equity is being asked to underwrite. The $1.18B/2030 target requires +22% EBITDA over five years from a line that just printed flat-to-down on a clean basis — and the FY2026 mid-guide of $988M is barely above that underlying.
The market is paying ~16× EV/EBITDA for an EBITDA line that, on the company's own ex-insurance number, has not grown.
3 · Moat

A 60-year treaty, an Aena-grade margin, and half the tunnel still unsold.

2086
Treaty horizon longest in listed European concessions
53.9%
Group EBITDA margin only Aena (60%) is comparable
45.6%
Tunnel path occupancy over half the asset is unsold
144
Le Shuttle yield index +44% over five years on flat volumes

The Treaty of Canterbury and the Concession Agreement formally preclude a competing fixed link, and the Railway Usage Contract locks Eurostar/SNCF/DB/GBRF tolls at CPI minus 1.1 points through 2052 — $483M of bond-like revenue. EU ETS hits 70% of ferry emissions in 2025 and 100% from January 2026; the UK Seafarers Wages Act and France's Loi Le Gac have closed the labour-cost arbitrage since 2024. The next decade of EBITDA growth lives in the path-occupancy line — Virgin won Temple Mills depot access in October 2025, Eurostar ordered 30 Avelia Horizon trains, and Trenitalia is targeting 2029 — capacity that drops to EBITDA at near-zero marginal cost.

4 · Ownership

Two strategic blockholders sit one share from a forced takeover bid — and one of them disavowed the bid in writing.

  • Eiffage at 29.40% / 29.50% voting. Built from 7.11% (early 2024) to 27.66% by YE 2025 with an off-market block from Platinum Compass on 23 October 2025 at $20.78 per share (price-protected for 18 months); added another 1.74% on-market between 23–26 March 2026 at $20.01 average. Sits 0.60pt below the AMF 30% mandatory-tender threshold.
  • Mundys at 25.0% / 29.9% voting. The Italian infrastructure group (Edizione/Benetton + Blackstone) moved from 15.49% to 19% on 31 March 2026, then exercised its option for a further ~6% after UK regulatory clearance on 13 April 2026; CEO Andrea Mangoni has been on the Getlink Board since July 2025. Combined ~54% of capital and ~59% of votes between the two.
  • The catch. Eiffage's October 2025 letter to the AMF stated explicitly that it does not intend to take control and is not acting in concert with anyone else — yet both CEOs personally bought GET shares on the open market in 2025 (de Ruffray 2,000 at $18.10 in March 2025; Mangoni 3,942 at $17.92 in December 2025). Either someone crosses 30% and a mandatory bid follows, or the disavowal holds.
Watch which signal arrives first: a 30% threshold-crossing filing, or a renewed disavowal at the 27 May 2026 AGM.
5 · ElecLink

The 'infrastructure' segment is a merchant power-trading book with an open-ended regulator hand on the upside.

  • Revenue collapsed and rebounded. ElecLink ran $579M (2023) → $291M (2024) → $264M (2025), a 57% two-year decline driven by two cable failures in nine months and normalising FR–UK power spreads. Q1 2026 came back at $80M (+112% YoY); by the 23 April Q1 trading update, 89% of 2026 capacity had been pre-sold for $342M, with only 36% of 2027 secured.
  • The $606M provision the market doesn't price. An IAS-37 profit-sharing reserve grew $129M YoY at FY2025 (from $477M at YE 2024); the company itself notes that 'the final rules governing the practical implementation of this profit-sharing mechanism' remain to be clarified. This is the largest unquantified accounting estimate in the file.
  • What it means for the multiple. A 70% headline segment EBITDA margin sits exposed to a regulator-shaped cash claw-back, and a 25-year merchant exemption is not a 60-year concession. The bull case treats ElecLink as recurring infrastructure cash flow; the auditor's KAM language treats it as a model with a moving denominator.
6 · The dividend

A $517M payout against $439M of company-defined free cash flow — and management committed to grow it €0.05 a year to 2030.

$0.94
FY2025 dividend per share +38% from $0.68
0.85×
Cover on company-defined FCF $517M proposed payout / $439M FCF
4.3%
Forward yield at $21.78 spot
3.95×
Net debt / EBITDA $3.99B over $1,009M

On the broader CFO-minus-capex definition, FCF was $736M and the proposed $517M payout absorbs ~70% — comfortable, but the company-published FCF metric ($439M) does not cover the cash going out the door, and that figure fell $114M YoY in 2025. The committed path to roughly $1.18 by 2030 sits against an EBITDA line that is essentially flat ex-insurance. At ~4× leverage, a missed print and the yield would need to clear at a wider level — a setup the current ~16× EV/EBITDA multiple does not embed.

7 · Bull & Bear

Lean cautious — the moat is real and undisputed, but the price is asking the underlying to do work it hasn't yet done.

  • For. A 60-year treaty-locked monopoly with a Railway Usage Contract running to 2052 at CPI minus 1.1pt; 78% of EBITDA inside that core at a 53.9% margin matched only by Aena.
  • For. 45.6% path occupancy with concrete HSR ramp — Virgin granted Temple Mills depot access October 2025, Eurostar ordered 30 Avelia Horizon trains in October 2025, and ETCS / ATO upgrades targeting a lift of capacity from 20 to 24 paths/hour through ~2030. Capacity drops to EBITDA at near-zero marginal cost.
  • Against. FY2025's $1,009M was $966M ex-insurance, below the FY2024 reported $865M only on a like-for-like native-currency basis; the FY2026 mid-guide of $988M is only marginally above that underlying. The +22% to $1.18B by 2030 is not yet visible in the run rate.
  • Against. ElecLink is a merchant book with a $606M IAS-37 provision the company flags as not yet fully defined; the dividend is uncovered on company-defined FCF (0.85×); Eiffage explicitly disavowed take-out intent in writing to the AMF.
My view — the multiple already prices the moat and the underlying has not earned the next leg. The H1 2026 print on 23 July resolves more than any other single observation; an above-mid-guide ex-insurance number flips the lean long, a sub-$975M number forces consensus to rebuild the 2030 path from scratch.

Watchlist to re-rate: Watch the 23 July 2026 H1 EBITDA print versus the $988M mid-guide ex-insurance; AMF threshold-crossing filings on Eiffage (29.40%) and Mundys (25.0%); ElecLink forward 2027 capacity sales (currently 36%) and CRE / National Grid / RTE finalisation of the profit-share rules.